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 1 Introduction
Biofuels are widely regarded as a means to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions because they have the potential, relative to the fossil fuels they re-
place, to reduce GHG emissions. Consequently, biofuel subsidies have been
promoted because of their potential environmental beneﬁts (Hill et al. 2006).
In 2006, in selected OECD countries, the total level of government support
for biofuels exceeded $10 billion (Steenblik, 2007). This is despite the fact
t h a t ,o n e ,aﬁrst-best instrument to control GHG emissions would be to es-
tablish a carbon tax or an equivalent cap-and-trade scheme and, two, biofuels
production is blamed for some of the recent increases in prices of a number
of food staples (FAO 2008).
Until very recently the supply-side dynamics of biofuel subsidies and their
eﬀects on inter-temporal extraction of fossil fuels have been ignored. The
presumption has been that by increasing the supply of a readily-available
substitute this would lower the price of fossil fuels, thereby lowering the in-
centive to extract.1 However, if fossil fuel resource owners optimally extract
their reserves and expect on-going or increased subsidies for biofuel produc-
tion then they may increase their current levels of extraction.2 It is even
possible that this supply-side eﬀect may overwhelm the substitution eﬀect
from fossil fuels to biofuels and increase GHG emissions leading to a Green
Paradox (Sinn, 2008b). However, this would depend, among other factors,
on the direct reduction in GHG emissions that arises from biofuel-fossil fuel
substitution.3
1A secondary argument is that with increased production of biofuels, technological
progress will lower costs of production due to learning by doing.
2This is similar to the insights of Long and Sinn (1985) who investigate how extractive
ﬁrms respond to anticipation of future tax changes.
3The extent to which direct biofuel-fossil fuel substitution reduces GHG emissions is
a matter of some debate. An authoritative study on this issue indicates that with direct
substitution there would be a reduction in GHG emissions of 12% for ethanol and 41% for
biodiesel (Hill et al. 2006).
2The possibility that adverse supply side eﬀects may arise has been iden-
tiﬁed by Sinn (2008a) in the case of carbon taxes. Sinn’s view is supported
by Hoel (2008) using a model of investment in a backstop technology, and
extends earlier work on the optimal trend of fossil fuel taxation (Sinclair
1992, Ulph and Ulph 1994). We show that this line of argument is equally
valid in the context of biofuels subsidies. In other words, policies designed
to reduce GHG emissions by subsidizing biofuel production may increase
fossil fuel production. We deﬁne such an outcome as a Weak Green Para-
dox. In turn, increased fossil fuel consumption may raise atmospheric GHG
concentration levels that would depend on many factors such as future tech-
nological change that may aﬀect extraction costs, the reductions in GHG
emissions from biofuel-fossil fuel direct substitution, and the eﬀects of GHG
concentration levels on the rate of carbon decay in the atmostphere. We
deﬁne this second outcome as a Strict Green Paradox.
In this paper we develop formal models to study the conditions under
which the Weak Green Paradox would (or would not) hold in the context of
the direct subsidization biofuels production (such as in the US) or quantita-
tive regulations that ensure minimum levels of biofuel consumption (such as
in the EU). The analysis focuses on the supply response of fossil fuel produc-
ers, and the resulting general equilibrium changes in price paths and quantity
paths.
In the simplest case where the supply curve of biofuels is upward sloping,
and where biofuels are a perfect substitute for fossil fuels, at any given price
of energy a subsidy on biofuel production will shift the biofuel supply curve
to the right, resulting in a lower demand for fossil fuels. However, the equi-
librium price path of energy is not given, because suppliers of fossil fuels will
react to the biofuel subsidies. Thus, as soon as a credible time path in terms
of the subsidy rate is announced or deduced, fossil fuel producers should ad-
just their output paths. Depending on supply and demand elasticities, this
3may induce increased fossil fuel production.
We ﬁrst investigate the possible eﬀects of biofuel subsidies on the time
p a t ho ff o s s i lf u e le x t r a c t i o n . 4 In this approach, consumption of fossil fuels
is equal to extraction from an aggregate stock of fossil-fuel resource, .I f
biofuel subsidies have the eﬀect of hastening the exhaustion of the stock 
(i.e., shifting extraction of fossil fuels to the present), this allows for the
possibility of a Weak Green Paradox which arises when fossil fuel production
more than oﬀsets the direct substitution to biofuels. We examine separately
the cases of linear and non-linear demand, and extraction costs that depend
on the remaining reserves.
In addition to analytical results, we provide numerical simulations of the
eﬀects on fossil fuel production from biofuels subsidies under a range of pa-
rameter values. We also present a set of suﬃcient conditions for fossil fuel
production to increase in the presence of biofuel subsidies, and suﬃcient
conditions when it fails to hold. Overall, our ﬁndings indicate that biofuel
subsidies could increase fossil fuel production in the foreseeable future and,
thus, result in a Weak Green Paradox.
2 Weak Green Paradox: competitive extrac-
tion
This section presents a model of energy demand in a perfectly competitive
world, and shows that increased fossil fuel production can more than oﬀset
substitution to biofuels due to subsidies for biofuel production.
In our model, there are two consumption goods: a numeraire good (leisure)
and a manufactured good. The latter good uses fuels as an input. The de-
mand for the manufactured good gives rise to the demand for fuels. Assume
4There are a number of studies of biofuel subsidies (e.g. Chakravorty et al., 2009,
Bahel Marrouch, 2009) and but they do not focus on the eﬀect of subsidies on the date of
exhaustion of the fossil-fuel stock.
4there are two types of fuels: fossil fuels and biofuels. For simplicity, we
assume they are perfect substitutes.
Let  denote the market price of fuels at time . The present moment is




where 0()  0.
Assume that biofuel producers receive a constant ad valorem subsidy rate
 ≥ 0, i.e. for each unit they sell, they receive (1+).L e t  ≡ 1+ ≥ 1.
We call  the “subsidy factor”, where  =1indicates that the subsidy rate
is zero. Let  denote the quantity of biofuels supplied. The supply function
of biofuels is
 = ()
where we assume 0
  0 and (0) =  ≥ 0.
At time  =0 ,t h e r ei saﬁxed aggregate stock of fossil fuels, .T h e
suppliers of fossil fuels are far-sighted and perfectly competitive extractive
ﬁrms. They perfectly forecast the equilibrium price path () which they
take as given. We assume that the marginal cost of extraction is a constant
 ≥ 0.I fe x t r a c t i o nr a t e sa r es t r i c t l yp o s i t i v eo v e rs o m et i m ei n t e r v a l[0]
then, by Hotelling’s Rule,5 the “net price” (i.e. price minus extraction cost)
 −  must rise at a rate equal to the rate of interest, i.e.
˙ 
 − 
=  for  ∈ [0] (1)
The demand for fossil fuels is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the de-
mand for fuels and the supply of biofuels:
(;) ≡ () − () (2)
5See Gaudet (2007) for a survey of theoretical and empirical studies on Hotelling’s
Rule.
5We call (;) the residual demand function. Given , there is a unique
price  such that the supply of biofuels just matches the demand for fuels.
The price  is implicitly deﬁned by
() − ()=0 (3)
Clearly, () cannot rise above .W ec a l l “the choke price for fossil fuels”.
Notice that  depends on the subsidy factor .A h i g h e r implies a lower
. For ease of reference, we state this result as Fact 1:


















¢  0 (4)
Market equilibrium requires that the stock of fossil fuels be exhausted
exactly at the (endogenously determined) time  when  reaches We will
show below how the exhaustion date  and the initial price 0 depend on
the subsidy factor .I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,w ea s s u m et h a t .B yd e ﬁnition,
the price of fuels at the exhaustion time  is equal to the the choke price for
fossil fuels, :
 = 
From Hotelling’s Rule, the present value of the net price is the same for
all  ∈ [0]:
( − )
− =(  − )
− for all  ≤ 
i.e., for all  ≤ ,
 =  +(  − )





(−) ≡ (()) (5)













(−)  0 (7)
To determine , we use the equilibrium condition that total demand for fossil
fuels over the time interval [0] is exactly equal to the initial stock  :
Z 
0
(;) =  (8)
where  is given by eq (5). In other words, the following equation uniquely
determines the resource-exhaustion date  :
Z 
0
((());) =  (9)
We seek the answer to the following question: does an increase in the
subsidy factor  bring the exhaustion time  closer to the present? If the
answer is “yes”, then we say that the Weak Green Paradox is conﬁrmed. As
a ﬁr s ts t e p ,l e tu ss t a t eau s e f u lL e m m a :
Lemma 1: An increase in the subsidy factor  will bring the resource-



















((());) −  (11)
The equilibrium condition that the stock of resources is exhausted at time ,
i.e. ()=0 , implicitly determines  as a function of . The derivative







































In general, the sign of the right-hand side of equation (14) is uncertain.
Let us consider a few special cases.
2.1 Weak Green Orthodox: linear demand
Let us consider the special case where the fuel demand function () is linear,
()= −    00
and the biofuel supply function is
()= + ()
  00
where  is a constant. Then the demand function for fossil fuels is
(;) ≡  −  −  − ()

The “fossil fuel choke price” () is implicitly deﬁned by







 + ()−1  0










































From Lemma 1 and equation (16), we can state a result that does not
support the Weak Green Paradox:
Proposition 1: Assume that the demand function for fuels and the sup-
ply function of biofuels are both linear. Then under perfectly competitive
extraction,
(i) if extraction costs are zero ( =0 ) , an increase in the biofuel subsidy
factor  will have no eﬀect on the date of exhaustion of the resource stock
;
(ii) if extraction costs are positive (0),a ni n c r e a s ei nt h eb i o f u e l
subsidy factor  will delay the date of exhaustion of the resource stock 
2.2 Weak Green Paradox: non-linear demand
An unattractive feature of the linear demand speciﬁcation is that the demand
for fuels becomes zero at some ﬁnite price. Many people would argue that
t h ed e m a n df o rf u e l si sa l w a y sp o s i t i v ea ta n yﬁnite price. Let us consider
the case where the demand for fuels is of the form

 =(  + )
− ≡ () (17)
where  ≥ 0 and 0.
The demand function (17) may be derived from the demand for the man-
ufactured good. For example, suppose that to produce one unit of the man-
ufactured good, one needs to use one unit of fuels and one unit of labor. Let
 be the price of fuels and  be the wage rate. Assume perfect competition
and constant returns to scale in the manufactured good industry. Then the
price of the manufactured good is equal to its unit cost, which is the sum of
 and  :
 =  + 













By choice of units of measurement,  = . From this we obtain the fuel




















Therefore  is smaller than or equal to , with equality holding only in the
case where  =0 .
We continue to assume that the supply function of biofuels is of the form
()= + ()
  000 (19)
Then the (residual) demand for fossil fuels is
(;)=(  + )




− −  − ()
 =0





( + )−−1 + ()−1  0















−1() (( + )−−1 + ()−1)





Let us formalize our result as follows:
Assumption A: The fuel demand function has the form (17) and the
biofuel supply function has the form (19).
Proposition 2: U n d e rA s s u m p t i o nA ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h es u b s i d yf a c t o r







−1() (( + )−−1 + ()−1)

















( + )−−1 + ()−1









This condition is satisﬁed under plausible speciﬁcations of parameter values.
Numerical examples
In our base-line scenario, the parameters are:
 =  =  =  =1  =0 05 =  =0 (21)
Let the reserve size  be large enough so that under this base-line scenario,
the exhaustion time is  =1 0 0years.
Then we ﬁnd that, starting at the initial subsidy factor  =1  an increase




This shows that the Weak Green Paradox holds if the reserve size is such
that  =1 0 0 . Is this result sensitive to the size of the reserve? Let us vary
the reserve size so that  varies from 50 years to 200 years. We ﬁnd that
 remains negative, and not far diﬀerent from −209.T a b l e 1 b e l o w
reports the value  for various reserve sizes (and hence various ).
11We also consider diﬀerent initial subsidy levels, and keep  =  =  =
 =1 ,  =0 05,  =  =0 ,  =1 0 0  Table 2 reports the results and shows
there is a Weak Green Paradox for this set of parameter values. Keeping
 =  =  =1 ,  =0 05,  =0 ,  =1 0 0 , we can also consider diﬀerent
values for demand elasticity  of the manufactured good. These results are
reported in Table 3. Finally, consider diﬀerent values for supply elasticity of
biofuels, .W eﬁnd that the Weak Green Paradox holds for a wide range of
 as reported in Table 4. As shown in this Table 4, with the exception of
the ﬁrst column where the supply elasticity of biofuels is smal, an increase
in the subsidy rate will hasten the exhaustion of fossil fuels.
3 Weak Green Paradox: cartel extraction
What happens if oil is supplied by a cartel that behaves like a monopolist?
We assume that the monopolist takes the subsidy factor  as a given
constant. How does an increase in  aﬀect the extraction path?
As in Section 2, the residual demand function facing the oil producer is
(;) ≡ () − ()
The choke price for fossil fuels is ,w h e r e() − ()=0 ,a n d is
decreasing in , as we have stated in Fact 1, see equation (4). We continue
to assume that  is greater than the marginal cost of extraction, .
Let  denote the monopolist’s stock of reserves at time ,s ot h a t0 = 
and ˙  = − where  is the extraction rate. We assume that the monopo-
list’s extraction matches the demand for fossil fuels:
 = (;)





and a terminal date  to maximize the present value of its







subject to the constraint
˙  = −(;) 0 = 
 ≥ 0









Assumption B: The elasticity of demand for fossil fuels is (i) greater than




Let  denote the current-value shadow price of the stock  and let 
denote the current-value Hamiltonian. Then
 =(  − )(;) − (;)











˙  = 
 ≥ 0  ≥ 0  =0
 =[  −  − ](;)=0
6As is well known, the monopolist always restricts supply so that   1.
13One can show that conditions imply that  =  −0,  =0 ,  = ,
(;)=0 ,a n d = ∞. In particular, we obtain the Hotelling Rule
for the monopolist: the present value of marginal proﬁti st h es a m ef o ra l l













Equation (22) implicitly deﬁnes the monopolist’s optimal price  as a
function of , ,  and  :
 = 
(();) (23)
Note that the function 
 in (23) is of the same nature as the function 
in (5) but they do not have the same functional form. Furthermore, the
function 
 depends on  both via (;) and via .











( −  − ( + ))














R e t u r n i n gt ot h eg e n e r a lc a s e ,w em a k eu s eo f( 2 3 )t od e t e r m i n et h e
monopolist’s optimal exhaustion time .I ti st h ev a l u eo f such that total




((););) =  (24)
Lemma 2: An increase in the subsidy factor  will bring the monopolist’s






























The equilibrium condition that the stock of resources is exhausted at time ,
i.e. ()=0 , implicitly determines  as a function of . The derivative
















































In general, the sign of the right-hand side of equation (26) is uncertain.
Thus, we consider a few special cases.
3.1 Linear demand for fuels and linear supply of bio-
fuels





































Proposition 3: Assume that the demand function for fuel and the supply
function of biofuel are both linear. Then, under monopoly extraction,
15(i) if extraction costs are zero ( =0 ) , an increase in the biofuel subsidy
factor  will have no eﬀect on the date of exhaustion of the resource stock
;
(ii) if extraction costs are positive (0),a ni n c r e a s ei nt h eb i o f u e l
subsidy factor  will delay the date of exhaustion of the resource stock 
3.2 Non-linear demand
In this subsection, we consider the case where Assumption A is satisﬁed. In
addition, assume  =1and  =0 .T h e n  =(  + )− − ,a n dt h e
elasticity of demand for fossil fuels is
 =
[( + )−−1 + ]
( + )− − 
 0 for   





It can be veriﬁed that Assumption B is satisﬁed. Equation (22) becomes
½
 −
[( + )−−1 + ]





















Denote the right-hand side of equation (27) by ().E q u a t i o n
(27) yields the implicit function  = 





















































In other words, a higher biofuel subsidy increases the elasticity of demand








2 [ + ( + )−−1 + ]
Ω
 0



































It appears that using this expression, the integral (25) can be positive or
negative, depending on parameter values.
Proposition 4: Under Assumptions A and B, the Weak Green Paradox
is a possibility when fossil fuels are supplied by a cartel.
4A T w o - c o u n t r y M o d e l
We now turn to the case where there are two countries with diﬀerent energy
policies. For simplicity we do not consider game theoretic or food policy
issues (Bandyopadhyay et al. 2009). The “home country” is the U.S. The
“foreign country” is China. There is no biofuel production in China. Assume
that U.S. biofuels are not exported to China (e.g. because of high transport
costs or other barriers to trade, or because the U.S. production subsidies are
only given to domestically earmarked consumption).
17Let  be the world price of fossil fuels. Assume that China’s inverse
demand function for fuels is






 is the quantity demanded in China. Similarly, the US inverse
demand function for fuels is





Then   is a measure of China’s market size relative to the U.S.’s market
size. By an appropriate choice of units, we can set  =1 .
When the price is ,U . S .b i o f u e lp r o d u c e r se a r n for each unit they
sell domestically, where  is the subsidy factor. The biofuel supply function
is  =  ()
 and the U.S.’s residual demand for fossil fuels is 
 =
 −  −  ()
.L e t be the solution of













 +  ¡

¢−1  0 (29)
Given a positive constant subsidy factor 0, the world equilibrium
consists of two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, fossil fuels are consumed in both
the U.S. and China. This phase ends at an endogenously determined time
,w h e n reaches the value  In the second phase, fossil fuels are only
used in China, and U.S. energy demand is completely satisﬁed by biofuel
production. The second phase ends at time , when the world price of
fossil fuels reaches the choke price  and China’s demand for fossil fuels
becomes zero.
Our task is to ﬁnd out how the subsidy rate  inﬂuences the two critical
times  and ,a n dh o wi ti n ﬂuences the equilibrium price path of fossil
fuels, and hence the rate of emissions of 2 at each point of time.
18Let () be the world (US and China) demand for fossil fuels during
phase I, and () be China’s demand for fossil fuels in phase II. Let  be
the initial stock of fossil fuels. Equilibrium requires that the total use of fossil








() =  (30)
We begin by evaluating the second integral on the left-hand side of (30).














(ln − ln()) ≡ ()















































It is easy to verify that () is an increasing function: the higher is the










19Let us turn to Phase I, in which fossil demands are positive in both
countries. The total accumulated consumption of fossil fuels in Phase I must

























 −  + ()

























































which is positive if  ' 1.







































































 is suﬃciently large in absolute value, an increase in biofuel subsidy
will bring the resource exhaustion date closer to the present.
Proposition 5: An increase in the subsidy factor  will lengthen Phase
II and may shorten Phase I. The exhaustion date will be brought closer to
the present if 
 is suﬃciently large in absolute value.
Remark: From equation (29), higher values of  will be favourable to
the Green Paradox.
5 Weak Green Paradox with stock-dependent
extraction costs
We now turn to an investigation of the possibility of a Weak Green Paradox
result in the case where extraction costs are stock-dependent. In what follows,
we consider a model where extraction cost rises as the remaining stock falls.
T h e r ea r et w op o s s i b l es c e n a r i o s . I nt h eﬁrst scenario, the marginal cost
of extracting the ‘last drop of oil’, although high, is still below the choke
price for fossil fuels, and therefore all the fossil fuel stock will eventually
be exhausted. In the second scenario, the last drop of oil is prohibitively
expensive to extract, and therefore ﬁrms will abandon their deposits without
exhausting them.7 We investigate the possibility of the Weak Green Paradox
in both cases.
7Some authors have therefore modeled the “resource exhaustion” in the sense of an
“economic abandonment” of the deposit after the proﬁtable part has been exploited (see
for example Karp, 1984, Rubio and Escriche 2001, Salo and Tahvonen, 2001, Chou and
Long, 2009, Fujiwara and Long, 2009).
215.1 A model of stock-dependent extraction costs
We assume that oil ﬁrms are perfectly competitive. They take the price path
as given. Let 0 =  denote the initial stock of the representative ﬁrm, and
 denote its output at .L e t be the stock that remains at time .T h e n











 0 = 
Then 0 +(  − )1 i st h em a r g i n a lc o s to fe x t r a c t i o na tt i m e.A s t h e
remaining stock  falls, the marginal extraction cost rises. If  =0 ,t h e
marginal extraction cost is 0 + 1.T h u s0 + 1 is the marginal cost of
extracting the last drop of oil, and 1 is the sensitivity of marginal cost to
the remaining stock.
It is convenient to deﬁne a new state variable, , which represents accu-
mulated extraction from date 0 to date  :
 ≡  −  0 =0  ˙  = 
Then the marginal extraction cost function may be written as ( )=
0 + 1.
As in the earlier sections, let the demand function for fuels be 
 = ()
0  0,w h e r e is the quantity of fuels demanded. Let the supply function
for biofuels be  = () 0
  0. Then the demand for fossil fuels falls
to zero at the “fossil fuel choke price”  deﬁned by
() − ()=0
Since the representative oil ﬁrm’s marginal cost is 0 + 1,a n d ≤ ,w e
conclude that:
(i) if 0+1() then the representative ﬁrm will eventually exhaust
all its stock,
22(ii) if 0 + 1(), the representative ﬁrm will abandon its deposit





= (),   0 (31)
We will consider these two cases separately. Before doing so, let us make
some clariﬁcation about the Hotelling Rule which we will use to explore the
Weak Green Paradox.
5.2 Hotelling Rule when extraction costs are stock-
dependent
What is the correct Hotelling Rule if the marginal extraction cost depends
on the stock? The answer depends on the assumption one makes about the
behavior of the ﬁrms. If ﬁrms do not “internalize” the added future cost
caused by its current extraction, the present value of net price (price minus
marginal extraction cost) must be the same at any pair of dates (0)
[ − (0 + 1)]




 − (0 + 1)=[ 0 − (0 + 10)]
−(0−)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to  we get
˙  − 1 ˙  = [0 − (0 + 10)]
−(0−)
Taking the limit as 0 → , we get the “non-internalized” Hotelling Rule8
˙  − 1 ˙  = [ − (0 + 1)] (33)
8Solow and Wan (1976) considered a macro-model of resource extraction with a con-
tinuum of heterogeneous ﬁrms, and assumed each ﬁrm produces only at a point of time.
By construction, these ﬁrms do not internalize the added cost, since each ﬁrm’s operating
life is inﬁnitessimally small. The authors obtained a kind of “non-internalized” evolution
of price. For a discussion of Solow and Wan (1976), see Kemp and Long (2009).
23On the other hands, if ﬁrms internalize the added future cost caused
by its current extraction, then the correct Hotelling Rule is the following
“internalized Hotelling Rule”9
˙  = [ − (0 + 1)] (34)
To prove that the rule (34) follows from optimizing behavior of far-sighted






−[ − (0 + 1)]
subject to ˙  =  0 =0and  ≤ .L e t be the co-state variable. The
current-value Hamiltonian is
 =  − (0 + 1) + 
The necessary conditions include
 − (0 + 1)+ =0
˙  =  −


=  + 1
From these two equations, we obtain the “internalized Hotelling Rule”, ˙  =
[ − (0 + 1)].
In what follows, we will use the internalized Hotelling Rule.
5.3 Weak Green Paradox with stock-dependent extrac-
tion costs and ﬁnite exhaustion date
As we have stated above, if the marginal cost of extracting the last drop of oil,
0 +1, is lower than the fossil fuel choke price, (), then the entire stock
 will be exhausted at some time . In this case, the Weak Green Paradox
is said to hold if a marginal increase in  leads to an earlier exhaustion date.
9See Gaudet (2007) for a literature review of internalized Hotelling Rule.
24To determine the exhaustion date , we must solve the following system
of diﬀerential equations
˙  = [ − (0 + 1)]
˙  = (;)
subject to three boundary conditions: 0 =0 ,  = ,  = ().O n c e
we have found , we can investigate how  responds to an increase in the
biofuel subsidy.
5.3.1 The linear demand case
Suppose the demand function (;) is linear. Let






+  0+1 so that the whole stock  will be exhausted in ﬁnite
time.
We must analyze the system
˙  = [ − (0 + 1)]
˙  =  − ( + )
subject to three boundary conditions: 0 =0 ,  = ,  = ().T h e
Appendix gives the solution.
In this case, we can show that the Weak Green Paradox does not hold.
This is stated as Proposition 6 below.
25Proposition 6: If the demand function (;) is linear in ,a n dt h e
entire stock  is exhausted at some time ,t h e n
(i) an increase in the subsidy factor  will delay the exhaustion date,
(ii) higher sensitivity of extraction cost with respect to the remaining stock
results in a later exhaustion date.
Proof:
From the assumption that 
+  0 + 1let us deﬁne







In the Appendix, we show that the exhaustion date  is the unique pos-
itive solution of the following equation
(2 − 1)
2−1 − 1−2 =
Ã
e  () − 
e  ()
!
























() ≡ () −
Ã
e  () − 
e  ()
!





















































As a numerical example, let  =3 =  =  =1and  =8 0 .W eﬁnd
the stock  will be exhausted in 370 years. If the subsidy factor is  =1 1,
we ﬁnd that  increases to 410 years. In this special case, the Weak Green
Paradox does not hold, at least in the long run.
5.3.2 The non-linear demand case
We conclude our results with the more general case of a non-linear demand
and suppose that
()=(  + )
− − ()





The system to be analyzed is as follows:
˙  = [ − (0 + 1)]
˙  =(  + )
− − ()

subject to three boundary conditions: 0 =0 ,  = ,  = () Unlike
linear demand case, we cannot obtain an analytical solution.




27At  =1  the fossil fuel choke price is 0618 Assuming that 0 =0 005,
1 =0 0001 and  =8 0 , we can solve for the current oil price (0) =
0017, and the exhaustion date  ' 1069 years. These cost and oil reserve
parameters imply that the current extraction cost/price ratio is 29%.U n t i l
the extraction date, costs in this case increases slightly from 0005 to 0013
but the fuel price increases faster from 0017 to 0618, and thus the relevant
cost/price ratio at the exhaustion date is just 2%.
For fossil fuel producers to abandon extraction before reserves are ex-
hausted, the subsidy must satisfy:
0 + 1 =0 013  () or 1538
Does a small increase in  lead to an increase or a decrease in ? The an-
swer depends on various parameters, particularly cost sensitivity or 1.O u r
numerical simulations show that if extraction costs increase faster as the re-
serve depletes (a large value of 1), then, starting from  =1 , a small increase
in the subsidy will make oil reserves last longer (a larger ). On the other
hand, if 1 is small enough, then an increase in the subsidy may lead to earlier
exhaustion. We illustrate this in Table 5 where the subsidy  is increased
from1 to 12 (∆ =0 2) .T a b l e5i l l u s t r a t e si ti sp o s s i b l et oﬁnd a large range
of cases where fossil fuel reserves are exhausted faster, and the Weak Green
Paradox holds.
The ﬁndings in Table 5 do not imply the Weak Green Paradox is a gen-
eral result. Indeed, if condition (31) holds, we can show that with linear
demand and a marginal extraction costs that increases linearly with accu-
mulated extraction, and without technological change, fossil fuel deposits are
abandoned before exhaustion and a subsidy for biofuels production results
in a smaller overall consumption of fossil fuels. In that case, we say that the
Weak Green Paradox does not hold in the long run. However, the long run
is very long (abandonment takes place at time inﬁnity). Thus, even when
28the Weak Green Paradox does not hold in the long run, our results indicate
that it can plausibly hold in the short or medium term.
The time period overwhich the Weak Green Paradox holds is critically
important. In terms of climate change and avoiding the severe impacts of
climate change, what happens to cumulative emissions over the next 30 years
interval is critical. It is this period of time that is likely to be the important
period in terms of biofuels subsidies as we might reasonably assume that new,
carbon neutral energy technologies will become more widespread beyond 30
years. Thus, in the time periods that matter we have real cause for concern
that biofuel subsidies may actually encourage larger GHG emissions from
fossil fuel combustion and increase the likelihood of the more severe impacts
of climate change.
Another relevant issue is technological change that aﬀects extraction costs
and the net price path on non-renewables. Technological change would seem
to be especially important in terms of stock-dependent extraction costs. Pos-
itive technological change should oﬀset the eﬀect of stock-dependent extrac-
t i o n ,a n dm a yd os of o ral o n gt i m e . T h eo v e r a l li m p a c to ft e c h n o l o g i c a l
change would depend on the relative changes of  over time, on the extent to
which technological changes aﬀect the extraction costs and the cost of biofuel
production, and the nature of stock dependent costs.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We examine some possible cases under which there may be a Weak Green
Paradox lurking behind policies of biofuel subsidies whereby the supply-side
response by fossil fuel producers more than oﬀset any gains from substitution
to biofuels. Whether the Weak Green Paradox holds or not depends on
demand and supply elasticities, expected changes in subsidies, technological
change in fossil fuel extraction and how extraction costs respond to changes
29in remaining reserves.
Our results suggest that a Weak Green Paradox from biofuel subsidies is
a real possibility: policies designed to reduce GHG emissions may, perversely,
hasten climate change. Further development of our models is necessary to
take into account game-theoretic issues, the eﬀects of technological change
on extraction costs, the impacts of GHG atmospheric concentrations and
the rates of decay, and the GHG reductions from direct biofuel-fossil fuel
substitution. Nevertheless, our ﬁndings are suﬃciently well developed to
require, at the very least, that policy makers carefully evaluate the supply-
side eﬀects of biofuel subsidies on the extraction rate of fossil fuels by resource
owners.
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32APPENDIX
Exhaustion with stock-dependent cost and linear demand
With the linear demand (;)= − ( + ) t h ef o s s i lf u e lc h o k e
price is ()= 
+. Assume that the marginal cost of extracting the last







≡ e  ()
Consider the system
˙  = [ − (0 + 1)]  0 0  0 1  0
˙  = (;)= − ( + )  0000
subject to three boundary conditions: 0 =0 ,  = ,  = ().

















where 11 = 12 = −1 21 = −( + ) 22 =0  1 = −0 and 2 = In
simpler notation,
˙ w = Aw + b







 +  
¸
Deﬁne e w by
















Now let us deﬁne x by
x ≡ w−e w
33Let 1  0 and 2  0 be the characteristic roots,
12 =
11 + 22 ±
q
(11 + 22)










where ∆ ≡ 
2 +4 1( + )



















where 1 and 2 are constants (to be determined using boundary conditions).
Deﬁne
1 ≡−(12)









Setting  =  in the matrix equation (35), and noting that have 1()=
 − e 1 =0and 2()= − e 2 =  − e 2 ≡  − e  (),w eg e tt w o
equations:
0=1 exp(1)+2 exp(2) (38)
 − e  ()=11 exp(1)+22 exp(2) (39)
Equation (38) gives
1 = −2 exp[(2 − 1)] (40)
Substituting into equation (39) to get
 − e  ()=−12 exp(2)+22 exp(2)
Therefore
2 =
 − e  ()
(2 − 1)exp(2)
(41)
Setting  =0in the matrix equation (35), we get two equations
0 − ()=1 + 2 (42)
0 − e  ()=11 + 22 (43)
34Since 0 =0 , substituting (40) and (41) into (43) we get
−e  ()=
 − e  ()
(2 − 1)exp(2)
[2 − 1 exp[(2 − 1)]]
or
(2 − 1)exp(2)
2 − 1 exp[(2 − 1)]
=
e  () − 
e  ()
(44)
Now, using (36), (37) and (44)
(2 − 1)exp(2)
−1 + 2 exp[(2 − 1)]
=






The function () has the following properties: (0)=1 () 




It follows that the equation
()=
e  () − 
e  ()
has a unique solution 0 (which depends on ).
Numerical examples




















1 = −4950975 × 10
−4






e  () − 
e  ()
=0 84
35yields the unique solution  =3 7 0 .
Now let  increase to 11.T h e n increases from 370 years to 410 years.
If 1 is higher, 1 =0 002 while  =1and  =8 0 . It will take 394 years
to exhaust 
Now let  increase to 11.T h e n increases from 394 years to 475 years.
36 50 75 100 150 200

 −175 −204 −209 −2110 −2113
Table 1: Eﬀect of a Biofuel Subsidy on Exhaustion Date for Diﬀerent Fossil
Fuel Reserve Sizes
 05 075 1 15 2

 −66 −343 −209 −099 −056
Table 2: Eﬀect of a Biofuel Subsidy on Exhaustion Date for Diﬀerent Initial
Subsidy Levels
 01 05 1 2 3

 −035 −134 −209 −289 −332
Table 3: Eﬀect of a Biofuel Subsidy on Exhaustion Date for Diﬀerent Demand
Elasticities of the Manufactured Good
 05 075 1 15 2

 145 −207 −209 −388 −375











∆ ∆∆ Paradox/ No
Paradox
0 0.005 0.54/0.618 -0.270 -1.35 Paradox
0.0001 0.013 0.54/0.618 -0.176 -0.88 Paradox
0.0002 0.021 0.54/0.618 -0.077 -0.39 Paradox
0.0003 0.029 0.54/0.618 0.025 +0.13 No Paradox
0.0005 0.045 0.54/0.618 0.244 +1.22 No Paradox
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